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Abstract 
In a laboratory experiment we study whether the endowment effect exists in a social and strategic 
context.  We employ a within-subjects design whereby participants are asked for their Willingness-
to-Accept (WTA) or Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) to play a series of 2x2 games. In the second part of the 
experiment, we study the endowment effect in lotteries with the same payoffs as the games in the 
first part. Our findings provide robust evidence for the endowment effect both in games and in 
lotteries, with the size of the effect actually being larger in games than in lotteries. We also find that 
the endowment effect can partly be attributed to optimism. 
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1. Introduction 
We report on an experimental test of whether the so-called ‘endowment effect’ exists when 
decisions are made in a strategic context. The endowment effect is observed when individuals place 
a higher value on a good when they are endowed with it, compared to when they are not. A large 
body of experimental studies has documented considerable evidence that provides support for the 
existence of the endowment effect in relation to individual decision-making (for a recent overview 
see Ericson and Fuster 2014). Most of these studies show that the entitlement affects the value of 
goods: average willingness-to-accept (WTA) values are greater than willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
values1. Endowment effect studies typically focus on situations where individuals are asked to trade 
consumption goods such as mugs, chocolate bars and pens (e.g., Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 
1990; Shogren et al. 2001; Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1994); less common consumption goods 
such as premium chocolate candies and tasting bitter liquids (e.g., Coursey et al., 1987; Bateman et 
al., 1997); or lottery tickets (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Harless, 1989; Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; 
Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Singh, 1991). We extend this literature by exploring whether the 
endowment effect survives in strategic and social contexts. In the experiment participants have 
either the right to play a game and are asked for their WTA, or they do not have the right to play and 
are asked for their WTP2. The decision-making contexts in our experiment allow us to elicit 
information (such as individuals’ expectations about others’ actions) that may help explain the 
presence of the endowment effect in a strategic context. 
From an economic perspective, the endowment effect is interesting because it can undermine the 
idea of a competitive equilibrium where all potential gains from exchange will be exhausted. The 
practical relevance of the endowment effect in social and strategic environments is also potentially 
large. The endowment effect is closely related to the status quo effect: the tendency to prefer the 
current state to alternatives. Such preference for the current state can bias the decision maker 
against both buying and selling (Kahneman et al. 1991, page 194) and in that sense the endowment 
effect can be considered a special case of the status quo bias. A status quo bias may lead to 
reluctance to give up existing political institutions for other institutions that would perform better. In 
a dynamic context Kloosterman and Schotter (2016) show how existing social institutions can 
influence the occurrence of new institutions. Institutions that have arisen for solving specific 
problems in the past may place constraints on the possible solutions of today’s problems. An implicit 
but essential assumption in their model is that the existing institutions are hard to change and thus 
are hard constraints. Possible reasons for the permanence of social institutions are coordination 
problems and the status quo bias. For example, it is unlikely that a newly formed state nowadays 
would adopt constitutional monarchy as a political system, but there are still 10 hereditary 
1 For meta-analyses on the WTA-WTP disparity, see Horowitz and McConnell (2002), Sayman and Onculer 
(2005) and Tunçel and Hammit (2013). 
2 There is a substantial experimental literature about how auctioning the right to play influences beliefs and 
behaviour, see for example Offerman and Potters (2006) and Shachat and Swarthout (2013). Typically, in these 
experiments behaviour in a treatment where the right to play is purchased is compared with behaviour in a 
treatment where no market for playing rights exists. In a treatment with a market for playing rights, a player is 
more likely to play against a participant with a high valuation than with a low valuation. This may influence the 
beliefs about the play of others and thus the own choice of action. But this effect would be the same in the 
WTA and WTP games, so we cannot expect an influence of this on the WTA-WTP gap, which is the main topic 
of the paper. 
                                                          
monarchies in Europe3. In our study, we do not focus on institutional changes directly, but for 
practical reasons we examine the WTA-WTP gap for the right to play a game.4 
In general it is far from obvious that regularities in individual decision-making will also be observed 
in a strategic context. According to Simon (1955) bounded rationality is characterized by the use of 
heuristics, and what heuristics are used depends very much on the context. As the attention of the 
decision maker may focus on different aspects in a more complex and strategic situation, it is not 
clear that observed behaviour in individual decision-making generalizes to such a setting. In our 
experiment we employ several different games. Coordination games can be considered to be in 
character close to a lottery (at least in theory), and because the endowment effect seems to be very 
robust for lotteries, we may expect to find evidence of the endowment effect also in these games. 
We also use other games, like the chicken game and the prisoners’ dilemma. In these games social 
preferences and beliefs about the actions of others may play an important role, which makes the 
situation more complex and less similar to a lottery.  
There are also possible reasons why the endowment effect will be observed in games and could be 
even larger in games than in lotteries. To evaluate the attractiveness of a trade, the decision maker 
may compare the price with some reference price (Thaler 1985, Putler 1992). Buying (selling) for a 
higher (lower) price than the reference price is a “bad deal”. Isoni (2011) shows theoretically that 
bad deal aversion can be an explanation for the decreasing WTA-WTP gap in repeated markets, 
assuming that decision makers adapt their reference price based upon earlier actual market 
outcomes. Weaver and Frederick (2012) experimentally manipulate the reference prices and are 
able to change the size of the endowment effect. Note that the reference price will be typically not a 
precise amount, and because of this fuzziness it can be influenced by observed market prices (Isoni 
2011) or information provided by the experimenter (Weaver and Frederick 2012). There may be an 
“imprecision interval” (Butler and Loomes 2007) around the reference price (see also Bayrak et al. 
2016) 5. To avoid bad deals the reported WTA and WTP values will be “on the safe side”: high in the 
interval for a WTA and low for a WTP. The WTA-WTP gap will thus depend on the size of the 
3 There are some experimental studies on voting for institutions, specifically sanctioning institutions in public 
good games (e.g. Markussen et al 2014, Kamei et al 2015). Some results are suggestive that the status quo bias 
may play a role. For example, in Markussen et al. (2014) all groups start with playing 4 periods under the no-
sanction institution and vote for no-sanction or informal sanction and 79% of the groups vote to continue 
under the no-sanction regime. Later in the experiment groups have to vote again between these two 
institutions but now they have been for the last 4 periods in a formal or informal sanction institution. 65% of 
the groups who are in the informal sanction institution now decide to stay there. Unfortunately they don’t 
have a treatment in which the order of play is changed, so we cannot know whether these decisions are 
caused by a status quo effect, or by positive experiences with this informal institution.  
4 Directly studying the status quo effect for social institutions would mean a design in which participants would 
first have to experience a certain institution for quite some time (e.g. punishing rules in a public good game), 
before we would give them the option to change that institution. The practical problem is that groups will have 
different experiences (good or bad), which may have a large effect on their willingness to change institutions. 
Whether a group will judge their experience as being good or bad will depend on their reference point 
(probably expectations), which cannot be controlled by the experimenter. This lack of control and probably 
considerable noise would cause a low statistical power. 
5 Recent findings in neuroscience suggest that when a decision maker estimates subjective value, confidence is 
automatically coded in the same region of the brain, see Lebreton et al. (2015). This confidence can be 
regarded as a judgment on the correctness of the valuation. A low confidence is analogous to a large 
imprecision interval. 
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imprecision interval. Okada (2010) shows that the WTA-WTP gap indeed increases with reference 
price uncertainty.  
One reason for analysing the possibility of the endowment effect in games is the high level of 
uncertainty or ambiguity in strategic situations. The uncertainty in a lottery is an explicit risk. In 
games the task is more complex as there is strategic uncertainty, which would make it even harder 
for subjects to establish a subjective utility or a reference price, and the imprecision interval may be 
larger than in lotteries. 
Another reason can be optimism and relates to how the decision maker has to form beliefs about 
the actions of others. Optimism is very common and it is even considered in the Western culture to 
be an appealing personality trait (see Ehrenreich 2009 for a review). In the case of optimism (or 
pessimism) subjective beliefs about the occurrence of an event are positively (negatively) dependent 
on the consequences of the event for the decision maker. An optimist who owns a lottery ticket will 
think it is more likely that his ticket will win than a ticket not owned by him, which leads to a higher 
subjective expected value of a lottery ticket that is owned. Such distorted beliefs would lead to a 
difference in WTA and WTP values. Note that this hypothesis is hard to test in an experiment using 
lotteries, because it does not make much sense to ask an experimental participant for a subjective 
belief after providing the objective probability (as the objective probability would be an obvious 
“right answer”). However, in games there is strategic uncertainty and no objective probability. It may 
be easier to maintain self-deceptive beliefs like optimism in games and thus optimism may be more 
important. If optimism were an explanation for the WPA-WTP gap, we would expect a higher 
subjective expected value of a game that is owned than of a game that is not owned. Due to beliefs 
in the games being elicited, we can test whether the endowment effect can be attributed to 
optimism by comparing the subjective expected value of the WTA and WTP games. 
Our experiment consists of two parts. In the first part, we study the presence of the endowment 
effect in games, whereas, in the second part of the experiment we study the endowment effect in 
lotteries. This is done for two reasons. First, if it so happens that we do not observe an endowment 
effect in games, this might have been caused by specific circumstances, like the subject pool, 
instructions, etc. In that case a null result would be more meaningful if we could show that the same 
participants show an endowment effect in lotteries. Second, since we elicit the subjective beliefs 
about the play of others, there is a direct relation between games and lotteries. For example, when a 
player expects that other players select “A” with a probability of 40% while they themselves play 
“B”, the value of the game should be equal to the value of the lottery where with 40% probability 
the payoff is equal to the payoff in the game with a (B, A) outcome and with 60% the payoff is equal 
to the game payoff for the (B,B) outcome (abstracting from social preferences). In the second part of 
the experiment participants face lotteries that are based upon the games of the first part, using 
either the mixed Nash equilibrium (which we refer to as “fixed lotteries”, see the design section) or 
the individual subjective beliefs measured in the first part (which we refer to as “subjective 
lotteries”) as the corresponding probabilities. 
We did not find any other experimental studies about the endowment effect in games. One study is 
indirectly relevant; in an experiment by Collins et al. (2015) the right to divide a sum of money 
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between oneself and a passive recipient is traded in a double auction market6. Note that a dictator 
game is not a strategic situation (there is no strategic uncertainty) and a double auction differs from 
the Becker-DeGroot-Marchak procedure we employ, but it is interesting that their data shows an 
endowment effect in this specific social context.7 
The next section will discuss the experimental design in detail, in section 3 the results will be 
presented and section 4 concludes.  
2. Experimental design 
The experiment consists of two parts. In the first part WTA and WTP values for the right to play the 
games were elicited. In addition, we ask for a choice in each game and we elicit expectations about 
the behaviour of others. In the second part WTA and WTP values for lotteries were elicited. We will 
first explain how the WTA and WTP values are elicited, then we will discuss the games employed in 
the experiment, how the lotteries of part two are constructed and we end the design section with 
the procedures. All the on-screen instructions, the paper handouts and relevant screenshots are 
included in the appendix.  
2.1 The implementation of the Becker-DeGroot-Marchak (BDM) procedure 
We use the BDM procedure (Becker, DeGroot & Marschak 1964) to elicit WTA and WTP values. The 
BDM procedure is a standard elicitation mechanism in the endowment effect literature. Plott and 
Zeiler (2005) are critical about the use of this mechanism and they argue that the endowment effect 
is caused by decision makers misunderstanding the mechanism. However, a recent study by Brebner 
and Sonnemans (2016) compares the size of the endowment effect using the BDM and the multiple 
price list (MPL) mechanisms, with lotteries as goods. An MPL is easier to understand but more time 
consuming. A robust endowment effect was found using both elicitation mechanisms. The MPL 
elicitation mechanism appears to result in a slightly larger endowment effect compared with the 
BDM mechanism, refuting claims that misconceptions of the BDM mechanism cause the endowment 
effect (see also Bartling et al. 2015 and Fehr et al. 2015). In brief, participants are asked to report 
their WTA or WTP values (in periods when they have or do not have the right to play, respectively), 
which they are told should be between 0 and 8 Euros. Whether they then actually play the game is 
determined by comparing their WTA and WTP value to a random draw on the interval [0, 8] Euros. 
For WTP periods, participants will take part in the game as long as the randomly drawn number does 
not exceed their stated WTP. Similarly, for WTA periods participants will take part in the game as 
long as the randomly drawn number is lower than their stated WTA. 
Since this is not a straightforward procedure for participants to understand, we started each session 
with detailed instructions explaining this elicitation mechanism. We provided numerical examples in 
order for participants to understand why it is optimal for them to report a WTA and WTP value that 
is equal to their own true value. Our instructions follow closely the examples as described in Isoni et 
al. (2011). Just before the start of the session, we put the exact amount of the random bids in a 
6 We thank a referee for pointing our attention to this paper. Collins et al. (2015) does not focus on the 
endowment effect, but on the effect of market interaction on social behaviour.  
7 The rights to be a dictator were allocated randomly, and under the assumption of a continuous distribution 
of private valuations, one would expect that about half of the rights would be traded. However, only 129 of 
the possible 320 trades took place (40.3%), which is statistically significant less than 50% (sign-test, p=0.0006). 
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sealed envelope (together with the random draws of the payoff relevant periods), which is placed on 
a whiteboard in the laboratory. This information is revealed to participants at the very end of the 
experiment and determines whether participants have bought or sold their right to play the 
randomly selected game for payment. 
2.2 Part 1: Games 
The first part has 20 periods. In the odd periods, participants get “the right to play” and report their 
WTA value. In the even periods, they do not have the right to play and report their WTP value. 8 In all 
periods they make a choice in case that period is paid out and they did buy or did not sell the game, 
and report their expectations about the play of others. To make it easier for participants to 
distinguish between WTA and WTP periods, the differences between these periods are highlighted in 
green and purple colours, respectively (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Screenshots of odd and even periods in part 1 
 
 
8 A similar design choice of alternating between (blocks of) WTA and WTP value elicitations is used by Plott and 
Zeiler (2005). 
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Table 1: Game parameters 
G
am
e 
1 
Co
or
d.
 WTA [50-50] 
 A B 
A 2, 2 4, 6 
B 6, 4 0, 0 
 
WTP [50-50] 
 A B 
A 3, 3 5, 7 
B 7, 5 1, 1 
 
 
G
am
e 
6 
 
Co
or
d.
 WTA [50-50] 
 A B 
A 2, 2 6, 10 
B 10, 6 -2, -2 
 
WTP [50-50] 
 A B 
A 1, 1 5, 9 
B 9, 5 -3, -3 
 
G
am
e 
2 
Ch
ic
ke
n 
WTA [50-50] 
 A B 
A 4, 4 2, 5 
B 5, 2 1, 1 
 
WTP [50-50] 
 A B 
A 3, 3 1, 4 
B 4, 1 0, 0 
 
 
G
am
e 
7 
 C
hi
ck
en
 WTA [30-70] 
 A B 
A 6, 6 3, 13 
B 13, 3 0, 0 
 
WTP [30-70] 
 A B 
A 5, 5 2, 12 
B 12, 2 -1, -1 
 
G
am
e 
3 
St
ag
 H
un
t WTA [60-40] 
 A B 
A 5, 5 1, 3 
B 3, 1 4, 4 
 
WTP [60-40] 
 A B 
A 4, 4 0, 2 
B 2, 0 3, 3 
 
 
G
am
e 
8 
 
St
ag
 H
un
t WTA [60-40] 
 A B 
A 4, 4 -4, 0 
B 0, -4 2, 2 
 
WTP [60-40] 
 A B 
A 5, 5 -3, 1 
B 1, -3 3, 3 
 
G
am
e 
4 
 
Co
or
d.
 WTA [50-50] 
 A B 
A 0, 0 7, 7 
B 7, 7 0, 0 
 
WTP [50-50] 
 A B 
A 1, 1 8, 8 
B 8, 8 1, 1 
 
 
G
am
e 
9 
 
Co
or
d.
 WTA [30-70] 
 A B 
A 0, 0 3, 7 
B 7, 3 0, 0 
 
WTP [30-70] 
 A B 
A 1, 1 4, 8 
B 8, 4 1, 1 
 
Ga
m
e 
5 
PD
 
WTA 
 A B 
A 6, 6 0, 7 
B 7, 0 3, 3 
 
WTP 
 A B 
A 7, 7 1, 8 
B 8, 1 4, 4 
 
 
G
am
e 
10
  
PD
 
WTA 
 A B 
A 7, 7 -3, 9 
B 9, -3 3, 3 
 
WTP 
 A B 
A 6, 6 -4, 8 
B 8, -4 2, 2 
 
Note: The payoffs of the above table correspond to Euros. Mixed strategy probabilities are given in square brackets (the first number 
corresponds to action A and the second one to action B). The order of play was the same for all participants and alternates WTA and WTP: 
1WTA, 2WTP, 3WTA, 4WTP, 5WTA, 6WTP, 7WTA, 8WTP, 9WTA, 10WTP, 2WTA, 3WTP, 4WTA, 5WTP, 6WTA, 7WTP, 8WTA, 9WTP, 10WTA, 
1WTP. 
 
In total, we elicited WTA or WTP values for ten games (20 periods), which are outlined in Table 1. 
Our games differ in three respects. First, we have included four different types of games. These are 
Coordination games (1, 4, 6 and 9), Stag hunt games (3 and 8), Chicken games (2 and 7), and 
Prisoner’s dilemma games (5 and 10). Second, the mixed equilibrium percentages can be 30%-70% 
(Games 7 and 9), 50%-50% (Games 1, 2, 4 and 6), 60%-40% (Games 3 and 8) or no mixed strategy 
equilibrium (the Prisoners’ Dilemma Games 5 and 10). Third, we vary the presence of negative 
payoffs depending on the action chosen. Games 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 only have positive payoffs, 
whereas, Games 6, 7, 8 and 10 include negative payoffs as well.9 
Notice that half of the games for which WTP is elicited are obtained by adding 1 euro to the 
corresponding WTA game and for the other half of the games for which WTP is elicited are obtained 
by subtracting 1 euro from corresponding WTA game. For example, in Game 1, the WTP game is 
obtained by adding 1 euro to the WTA variant of the game. This feature of the design is particularly 
well suited for making within-subject comparisons of WTP and WTA as it avoids having subjects 
value the same game twice, and is inspired by the manipulation of lotteries in Plott and Zeiler (2005) 
9 We note that only a very small proportion of bids correspond to the extreme values of 0 and 8 euros. In 
particular, for the games, 1.84% (21/1139) of the bids were equal to 0 euros and 8.08% (92/1139) of the bids 
were equal to 8 euros. For the lotteries, 7.68% (236/3074) of the bids were equal to 0 euros and 4.26% 
(131/3074) of the bids were equal to 8 euros. 
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and Isoni et al. (2011)10. In addition, another characteristic of our games is that row and column 
players are symmetric. This is done for practical reasons to avoid introducing different roles of row 
and column players. Note that participants did not receive feedback about the play of others during 
the experiment, which eliminates the possibility of learning11. The order of the games was the same 
for all participants. 
An interesting element of strategic interaction (as opposed to individual decision making) is that a 
particular choice of an action may depend on a participant’s beliefs about the opponent’s actions. 
Clearly, the beliefs of participants are likely to influence their stated values. For example, in the 
Prisoner’s dilemma Game 5 (see table 1), if a participant believes that his/her opponent will choose 
B with certainty, his/her willingness to pay for this game will not be more than 4 money units. It was 
therefore important to elicit participants’ beliefs about what fraction of the participants in a session 
will choose a specific action (A or B). The elicitation of beliefs was incentivised; at the end of the 
experiment the expectations in one randomly determined period are compared with actual choices 
of 10 other participants in that session and paid out.12 The use of participants’ beliefs becomes 
particularly important for the second part of the experiment, which is described below. 
2.3 Part 2: Lotteries 
After the first part of the experiment is completed, we also elicited information about participants’ 
valuations in 27 WTA lotteries and 27 WTP lotteries (54 periods). The lottery parameters that we 
used in our experiment are transformations of the parameters we used in each of the games 
outlined in Table 113. For example, from the WTA version of Game 1, we obtained the following two 
lotteries: A = (€2, 0.5; €4, 0.5) and B = (€6, 0.5; €0, 0.5). Of these lotteries 15 lotteries are “fixed 
lotteries” which use as probabilities the mixed strategy equilibriums of each game and 12 are 
“subjective lotteries” for which we used as percentages the elicited beliefs from the first part of the 
experiment. This was done only in the games where the mixed strategy equilibrium was different 
from 50%-50%. When the participant reported different beliefs in the WTA and WTP version of the 
game, we took the average of these beliefs. The comparison of the WTA and WTP values between 
the first and the second part provides us with an insightful within-subject comparison, which allows 
us to study how the size of the endowment effect in strategic decision-making situations compares 
with the size of the endowment effect in payoff-equivalent individual decision-making situations 
10 Our procedure is different than the procedures used in Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011) for 
lotteries which always added a positive amount to the WTP lottery. 
11 When we designed the experiment we thought about the possibility that sophisticated participants may 
anticipate that if they play the game they are more likely to meet an opponent who values the game highly, 
and this may tell something about the action of the opponent. For example, in WTA game 2 (chicken) one can 
expect a rational player who values the game higher than 4 to play B (because the maximum value of playing A 
is 4). Note that this effect does not differ between WTA and WTP cases and cannot be the cause of a WTA-
WTP gap. 
12 For the belief elicitation task, we asked each participant to indicate how many (out of 10 randomly selected) 
other participants have chosen action A and how many have chosen action B. Clearly, the sum of these two 
numbers should be equal to 10. The earnings are the number of correct predictions made, times 50 cents. For 
example, if the participant reported that 7 participants would choose A and 3 participants would choose B and 
we find that in fact 4 participants have chosen A and 6 participants have chosen B, 4 A-choices and 3 B-choices 
are correctly guessed and the earnings are 7*50 cents is 3.50 euros. 
13 This means that, like in the games, the payoff in WTP lotteries are 1 euro more or less than in the WTA 
lotteries. 
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(lotteries). The full set of lotteries that we used is provided in Appendix A. The order of the lotteries 
was the same for all participants, and we made sure that related lotteries were presented with at 
least 4 periods in between. 
2.4 Procedures 
The experiment is programmed in PHP/mysql and starts with a set of general instructions about the 
BDM procedure, with many examples, very much like the experiment reported by Isoni et al. (2011). 
This is followed by instructions about the task in part 1: the good is the right to play a game; we 
explain how to read a matrix game; we explain the task in each period (making a choice, reporting 
beliefs and value). After all participants have finished with the instructions and have correctly 
answered the questions that checked understanding, the first part of 20 periods starts. 
After the last period of part 1 the participants receive the instructions of part 2 and make their 54 
decisions for part 2. What periods would be paid, and the random values were randomly determined 
just before the session and put in a sealed envelope on the whiteboard, visible for all participants. 
After all participants have finished part 2, the sealed envelope is opened and the earnings are 
determined. Participants are paid according to their decisions in two randomly determined periods 
(possibly different) in part 1 (one WTA and one WTP game), the accuracy of their expectations in 
one randomly determined period in part 1 (games), and their decisions in two randomly determined 
periods in part 2 (one WTA and one WTP lotteries). 
To calculate the earnings for the selected period of part 1, we first compare the value reported by 
the participant with the random bid in the envelope. The game is played out when the participant 
had the right to play the game (WTA case) and did not sell that right because the random bid was 
lower than his reported value, or, when the participant did not have the right to play the game (WTP 
case) and did buy that right because the random bid was lower than his reported value. In this case 
the participant is paired with a randomly selected participant, who also did not sell or did buy the 
right to play the game. The actual choices of each pair together determine their final payoff.14 When 
the participant did sell the right to play game (WTA case) the participant receives the amount of the 
random bid. A participant who did not buy the right to play the game (WTP case) will not play the 
game and did not receive or pay any money. A similar procedure is used for part 2, only now no 
coupling is needed. Finally, participants filled in a short questionnaire (gender, age, field of study) 
before getting paid and leaving the lab. The experiment was run in the CREED laboratory of the 
University of Amsterdam and 116 participants (47% male and 53% female, 69% were students of 
economics or business and the remainder were mostly students in other social sciences) earned on 
average 22.50 euros (including a show-up fee of 7 euros) in about 1.5 hours. 
14 It might be the case that we end up with an odd number of participants who have the right to play. In this 
case, to avoid having problems with forming groups of two, we have randomly selected one participant (the 
identity of which is not known to anybody) at the beginning of the experiment, who may not play according to 
her/his preferences. If the randomly selected participant has the right to play the game, then s/he will not play 
the game. If the randomly selected participant does not have the right to play the game, then s/he will play the 
game (and their choices in the respective game will determine their payoff). Note that, in a session of 20 
participants, the probability of being this randomly selected participant is very low (about 2.5%, because in 
about half of the cases the number of participants who have the right to play will be odd, and there is a 5% 
probability to be the randomly selected participant). In our experiment, the sessions’ size varied between 18 
and 20 participants, and therefore the probabilities of being randomly selected were very similar across 
sessions. 
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 3. Results 
The data of two participants are excluded from the analyses because they obviously did not take the 
task seriously: one participant filled in 8 euros for all WTA and WTP questions and another 
participant filled in only amounts between 0 and 1 euro for all WTP and WTA questions. Due to a 
minor technical problem we missed the data of one decision in part 1 and 3 decisions in part 2 of the 
first session. The WTP games and lotteries are constructed by adding or subtracting one euro from 
the corresponding WTA game or lottery (see design section); for the analyses we respectively 
subtracted and added 1 euro to the WTP values, to make WTA and WTP values easily comparable. 
The first question to be answered is whether there is an endowment effect in games. Table 2 shows 
the mean, median and standard deviation of the WTA and WTP valuation per game. In 9 out of 10 
games, the average WTA is larger than the WTP and this difference is statistically significant in 7 
games. In 3 games, we find no significant WTA-WTP differences. Recall that we employ a within-
subject design for each game, and every pair of observations can be classified as either EE 
(WTA>WTP), anti-EE (WTA<WTP) and no-EE (WTA=WTP). Overall we find the endowment effect in 
about 63%, anti-endowment effect in 26%, and exactly the same valuations (no-EE) in 11% of the 
cases. Game 2 is the only game with a tendency against the endowment effect (although the effect 
is not statistically significant), but we can see no clear explanation for this: it is a chicken game but so 
is game 7, which shows a clear EE. The average gap between WTP and WTA is 84 cents. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for WTA-WTP valuations for each game 
 WTA valuation WTP valuation  Frequencies  
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Std. 
dev.  Mean 
 
Median 
Std. 
dev. 
p-
value  
 
EE No EE 
Anti 
EE 
n 
1 Coord. 4.41 4 1.58 2.52 2.1 1.59 0.000 92 13 9 114 
2 Chicken 3.83 3.75 1.40 4.13 3.5 1.81 0.258 45 14 54 113 
3 Stag Hunt 4.95 5 1.19 4.30 4 1.59 0.000 74 13 27 114 
4 Coord. 4.03 4 1.80 3.05 3 1.91 0.000 79 7 28 114 
5 PD 5.28 5.5 1.45 3.52 3.5 1.67 0.000 89 9 16 114 
6 Coord. 4.22 4 1.83 4.08 4 2.15 0.327 55 13 46 114 
7 Chicken 5.40 6 1.68 4.63 4.5 1.96 0.000 70 11 33 114 
8 Stag Hunt 3.47 3.9 1.73 2.81 3 1.85 0.000 69 18 27 114 
9 Coord. 3.56 3 1.82 1.91 1.5 1.95 0.000 90 10 14 114 
10 PD 4.76 5 1.87 4.56 4 1.90 0.253 54 17 43 114 
Note: p-values are based upon a Wilcoxon signed rank test (2-sided) 
 
We summarise the first result: 
Result 1: The endowment effect is observed in most games and for the majority of subjects. 
The next question is whether we find an endowment effect in lotteries as well. We have to 
distinguish between two kinds of lotteries, the fixed and subjective ones. The probabilities in the 
fixed lotteries are based upon the mixed Nash equilibrium and are thus the same for everyone. The 
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subjective lotteries are based upon the beliefs in the game as reported by that specific participant 
and these will thus differ between participants. 
Table 3 shows the average WTA and WTP values of the fixed lotteries. Note that we have no fixed 
lotteries associated with game 5 and 10 because the prisoner’s dilemma games do not have a mixed 
Nash equilibrium. We find a remarkably strong endowment effect: the WTA values are statistically 
significantly larger than the WTP values in all 15 lotteries. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for WTA-WTP valuations for each fixed lottery 
 R
el
at
ed
 G
am
e 
Pe
rio
ds
 W
TA
-W
TP
 
O
pt
io
n 
A 
O
pt
io
n 
B 
Pr
ob
. A
 
Pr
ob
. B
 
Ex
p.
 v
al
ue
 
WTA offer WTP offer 
 
Frequencies 
Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. p-value EE No EE 
Anti 
EE 
1A 5-28 2 4 50 50 3 3.02 3 1.00 2.39 2.5 0.89 0.000 71 28 15 
1B 37-50 6 0 50 50 3 3.11 3 1.28 1.79 2 1.34 0.000 83 16 15 
2A 29-10 4 2 50 50 3 2.99 3 0.89 2.60 2.5 0.83 0.000 65 26 22 
2B 45-38 5 1 50 50 3 2.92 3 1.07 2.64 2.78 0.91 0.025 56 23 35 
3A 1-16 5 1 60 40 3.4 3.49 3.4 1.33 2.87 3 1.03 0.000 72 18 24 
3B 11-44 3 4 60 40 3.4 3.43 3.4 0.93 3.06 3 0.58 0.000 63 27 24 
4AB 15-30 7 0 50 50 3.5 3.40 3.5 1.33 2.26 2.05 1.57 0.000 79 18 17 
6A 23-54 2 6 50 50 4 3.83 4 1.17 3.12 3 0.94 0.000 67 23 23 
6B 33-46 10 -2 50 50 4 3.67 4 1.92 3.07 3 1.49 0.001 60 19 35 
7A 17-2 6 3 30 70 3.9 3.87 4 0.99 3.30 3.23 0.86 0.000 71 24 19 
7B 41-24 13 0 30 70 3.9 4.42 4 1.76 3.45 3 1.84 0.000 70 16 28 
8A 3-18 4 -4 60 40 0.8 1.93 2 1.58 0.25 0 1.06 0.000 96 11 7 
8B 25-34 0 2 60 40 0.8 1.37 1 1.15 0.50 0.5 0.75 0.000 84 20 10 
9A 19-4 0 3 30 70 2.1 2.21 2 0.98 1.79 1.63 1.29 0.000 64 28 22 
9B 35-14 7 0 30 70 2.1 2.72 2.5 1.47 1.24 1 1.16 0.000 85 15 14 
Notes: p-values are based upon a Wilcoxon signed rank test (2-sided). The number of observations is 114 for each lottery, except for two lotteries with one missing value (periods 23 and 29). 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for WTA-WTP valuations for each subjective lottery 
Re
la
te
d 
Ga
m
e 
Pe
rio
ds
 W
TA
-
W
TP
 
O
pt
io
n 
A 
O
pt
io
n 
B 
WTA-WTP gap 
 
Frequencies 
Mean Std. dev. 
p-
value EE 
No 
EE 
Anti 
EE 
3A 39-6 5 1 0.02 1.50 0.206 56 20 38 
3B 51-22 3 4 0.37 1.03 0.000 69 30 15 
5A 21-40 6 0 1.38 1.66 0.000 79 24 10 
5B 31-52 7 3 0.93 1.45 0.000 71 26 17 
7A 47-32 6 3 0.54 1.36 0.000 70 24 20 
7B 7-12 13 0 0.90 2.09 0.000 65 15 34 
8A 53-42 4 -4 1.09 1.49 0.000 79 30 5 
8B 13-8 0 2 0.73 1.57 0.000 81 27 6 
9A 43-26 0 3 0.89 1.05 0.000 82 21 10 
9B 9-48 7 0 1.52 1.83 0.000 84 17 13 
10A 27-20 7 -3 0.17 1.64 0.951 46 16 52 
10B 49-36 9 3 0.86 1.76 0.000 72 17 25 
Note: p-values are based upon a Wilcoxon signed rank test (2-sided). The number of observations is 114 for each 
lottery, except for two lotteries with one missing value (period 21 and 43). 
 
The subjective lotteries are based upon the beliefs of the participant in the related game in 
part 1. A participant reports beliefs both in the WTA and WTP version of a game and for the 
probability in the lottery we use the average of these two beliefs. Table 4 shows a 
statistically significant endowment effect in 10 out of the 12 subjective lotteries15. 
Result 2: The endowment effect is observed both for the fixed and the subjective 
lotteries. 
We next focus on whether the endowment effect is larger or smaller in games compared 
with lotteries. Per individual we calculate the average difference between the WTA and WTP 
values for games, fixed lotteries and subjective lotteries. For 74 (72) of the 114 subjects this 
gap is larger for games than for fixed (subjective) lotteries. Across all 114 subjects, the 
average size of the gap is 84 cents for games, 80 and 79 cents for fixed and subjective 
lotteries respectively and this difference between games and lotteries is statistically 
significant (Wilcoxon test, p=0.048 for fixed and p=0.034 for subjective lotteries). The 
difference in the WTA-WTP gap between fixed and subjective lotteries is not statistically 
significant (p=0.794). Note that the smaller endowment effect in lotteries cannot be caused 
by learning because the participants did not receive any feedback on their choices until the 
end of the experiment.  
15 In appendix C we present the analyses of table 2, 3 and 4 with a selective group of participants who 
make no or only few mistakes which are defined as those bids which are dominated (defined as a 
WTA (or a WTP) bid which is higher than the maximum payoff and lower than the minimum payoff in 
that game (for a given action) or lottery). The results are the same for this selective group.  
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A second way to compare the endowment effect in games and lotteries is to compare the 
decisions in a given game with the decisions in the related subjective lottery. Note that 
when a participant has the same beliefs in the WTA and WTP game, and chooses the same 
action, the game is equivalent to the lottery with the only difference that the probabilities in 
the lottery are given (objective) while the probabilities in the game are subjective (assuming 
no social preferences). The beliefs about the actions of others in a game are measured in 
increments of 10%, and when the beliefs in the WTA and WTP game differ only by 10% or 
less (for example 30% and 40%, respectively) we can consider both beliefs as being 
equivalent to the average (35% in the example). However, when the beliefs differ more than 
10%, we cannot relate the lottery with the game anymore. Table 5 shows the comparison 
between the endowment effect in games and the related subjective lotteries, for the cases 
with the same actions and about the same beliefs in the WTA and WTP games (54% of all 
cases). Comparing the games/actions with the lotteries we find equally often the larger 
effect in the game than in the lottery, but in many rows there are only few observations and 
thus low statistical power. Most of the significant differences (3-A, 3-B, 5-A and 7A) are all in 
the direction of a larger effect in games than in lotteries, and also overall we find that the 
gap is larger in games than in lotteries (average of 87 versus 70 cents)16. 
Result 3: The average size of the endowment effect is statistically significantly larger in 
the games than in the lotteries. 
We find a significant endowment effect for 7 of the 10 games (see table 2) and for 25 of the 
27 lotteries (see tables 3 and 4), which suggests that the endowment effect is about equally 
robust both for games and lotteries (the proportions 7/10 and 25/27 are not statistically 
significant different, Fischer exact test p=0.11).  
Table 5 also shows that the valuations of the games are typically higher than those of the 
corresponding lotteries. Although ambiguity aversion combined with the strategic 
uncertainty of a game should lead to a lower valuation of the games, our participants 
apparently liked playing in a game better than a lottery17. 
The next question is whether being susceptible to the endowment effect is an individual-
specific characteristic. Two measures can be employed: the number of times a participant 
shows the endowment effect in games and in fixed lotteries, and the average individual size 
of the effect. Figure 2 shows a bubble graph and shows that typically the same participants 
display an endowment effect in games and fixed lotteries. The Spearman’s rank correlations 
between the average individual size of the gap in games and lotteries are 0.590 (fixed) and 
0.548 (subjective). Unsurprisingly, the gaps in the two kinds of lotteries are even more highly 
correlated: 0.772. 
16 We have rerun the analysis with also the cases included where the actions in the WTA and WTP 
game are different (which could be caused by a mixed strategy) and we find very much the same 
results. 
17 We cannot rule out an order effect; the lotteries part of the experiment is always and necessarily 
after the games part, because we needed the beliefs in the games part to construct the subjective 
lotteries. 
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Result 4: Participants who are prone to the endowment effect in lotteries are more 
likely to be prone to the endowment effect in games.  
Table 5: The size of the endowment effect compared in subjective lotteries and games 
 Choice in the  
WTA and the  
WTP game is: 
WTA-WTP Gap 
Games 
WTA-WTP Gap 
Subj.  
Lottery 
N p-value 
Game 
3 A 0.67 -0.08 59 0.004 
Stag Hunt  (1.57) (1.80)   
 B 1.19 0.34 9 0.075 
  (1.01) (0.86)   
5 A 1.84 1.24 35 0.038 
PDG  (2.13) (1.82)   
 B 1.62 1.23 22 0.211 
  (2.11) (1.38)   
7 A 1.13 0.30 26 0.067 
Coord.  (2.50) (1.54)   
 B 0.28 0.81 26 0.268 
  (1.98) (2.26)   
8 A 0.79 0.85 65 0.562 
Stag Hunt  (1.55) (1.55)   
 B 0.46 0.73 13 0.944 
  (1.99) (0.71)   
9 A 0.46 1.19 7 0.931 
Coord.  (1.88) (1.51)   
 B 1.61 1.18 39 0.211 
  (2.73) (1.95)   
10 A 0.28 0.27 30 0.934 
PDG  (2.65) (1.66)   
 B 0.05 0.86 38 0.053 
  (2.17) (1.60)   
Total  0.87 0.70 369 0.032 
  (2.12) (1.73)   
Notes: Only the cases where the actions in the WTA and WTP game are the same and the beliefs in the two 
games differ at most 10% are considered. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. In the last column, 
we report the two-sided p-value from a Wilcoxon sign rank test for the comparison of the WTA-WTP gaps in the 
games and lotteries. 
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Figure 2: The Endowment effect in games and fixed lotteries. 
 
Notes: For each individual we compare the number of EE cases in the fixed lotteries (horizontal axis) and games 
(vertical axis). The smallest bubble stands for one observation, the largest (top-right) for 6 observations. 
 
Additional analyses 
If the endowment effect is (partly) caused by optimism, the subjective expected value 
(based upon the decision and the subjective beliefs of the participant) of a WTA-game 
should be larger than the respective value of the corresponding WTP-game.18 Likewise, we 
categorize cases as pessimistic when the subjective expected value in the WTA game is 
lower than this value in the corresponding WTP-game. Figure 3 compares the WTA-WTP gap 
for optimistic and pessimistic cases and the cases where the beliefs in the WTA and WTP 
periods are the same19. Over all games we find that the WTA-WTP gap is larger in optimistic 
cases (110.3 cent) than in pessimistic cases (39.8 cents, Wilcoxon test p=0.0000) and larger 
in no belief change cases (102.7 cents) than in pessimistic cases (Wilcoxon test p=0.0005). 
18 As an example, the subjective expected value of WTA game 1 of a participant who has chosen 
action A is computed by the sum of i) the number of participants that a subject believes have chosen 
action A divided by 10 and multiplied by 2 (the A-A payoff) and ii) the number of participants that a 
subject believes have chosen action B divided by 10 and multiplied by 4 (the A-B payoff). 
19 Note that some of the “no change in beliefs” cases may in fact be optimistic or pessimistic cases, 
but with a change too small to be picked up with our measurement (for example when beliefs are 
46% and 54% of a A-choice the participant will report 50% in both cases). 
-1
1
3
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7
9
11
-1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
 15 
                                                          
The difference between optimistic and no belief changes is not statistically significant 
(Wilcoxon test p=0.1431). These tests are relatively crude because the extent of optimism 
and pessimism is not taken into account. Figure 3 suggests that the endowment effect is not 
particularly increased by optimism (as we expected) but decreased by pessimism. 
Note that a difference in subjective expected value between WTA and WTP can be caused 
by a change in beliefs and/or a change in the action chosen in the game. In case of a change 
in beliefs but no change in action the average WTA-WTP gap is 1.00 in optimistic cases 
(N=238) and 0.37 in pessimistic cases (N=265). The effect is larger when both the beliefs and 
the action change: the average WTA-WTP gap is in optimistic cases 1.40 (N=91) and in 
pessimistic cases 0.5 (N=108). Finally there are some cases with no (reported) change in 
beliefs but a change in action. In the majority of these cases (44 of the 74) the beliefs are 
according to the mixed equilibrium and the subjective expected value is the same for WTA 
and WTP; in addition we have only 20 optimistic cases (gap is 0.92) and 10 pessimistic cases 
(gap=0.09). 
 
Figure 3: WTA-WTP gap per game for optimistic, pessimistic and no changes in beliefs cases. 
 
Note: There are 2 cases that do not fit in any of these categories, where there are different beliefs in WTA and 
WTP, but also the action changed such that the subjective expected value stayed exactly the same. 
Table 6 displays OLS regressions; the dependent variable is always the WTA-WTP gap in 
games. In the first column we find a significant contribution of optimism as defined by the 
difference in the subjective expected value of a WTA and WTP game. In the second column a 
dummy variable representing the gender of the participant is added (1 if female and 0 if 
male), with an interaction effect with optimism (as separate regressor). We find that females 
display on average a smaller endowment effect. This is surprising, because the literature 
generally assumes that the endowment effect is caused by loss aversion, and numerous 
studies have shown that on average females are more loss averse than males (e.g. Schmidt 
-1
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0
0.5
1
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optimism no belief change pessimism
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and Traub 2002, Booij and van de Kuilen 2009). The interaction effect is not significant, so 
optimism seems to have the same effect on both sexes. In the third column the individual 
average endowment effect in lotteries is added to the equation. As expected from result 4 
above, this effect is highly significant. The coefficients of the optimism and gender are 
similar across the three regression models. In the fourth column we add an interaction term 
of optimism and the endowment effect in lotteries. This interaction effect is positive, and 
the coefficient of optimism becomes insignificant. This means that optimism mainly explains 
the endowment effect in games of those individuals that are more susceptible to the 
endowment effect in lotteries, as measured in part 2. 
Although the effect of optimism is a new and interesting finding, it cannot be the only cause 
of the endowment effect for two reasons. First, in the cases where there is no difference in 
beliefs, we still find a large average WTA-WTP gap of 98.91 cents. Second, the endowment 
effect is also often observed in familiar consumption goods that are in essence riskless, in 
which case optimism and pessimism cannot play a role. 
Result 5: Optimism can partly explain the endowment effect in games. The size of the 
endowment effect is positively correlated with the size of optimism, especially for 
participants who show a large EE in the lotteries. 
 
Table 6: Regressions of the size of the endowment effect in games 
 Dependent variable: size of the endowment effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Optimism 0.186 *** 
(0.064) 
0.196 *** 
(0.061) 
0.180 *** 
(0.059) 
0.047 
(0.079) 
Female  -0.654 ** 
(0.256) 
-0.696 *** 
(0.223) 
-0.690 *** 
(0.221) 
EE-lotteries   0.743 *** 
(0.161) 
0.737 *** 
(0.158) 
Female * Optimism  -0.018 
(0.125) 
-0.000 
(0.118) 
0.048 
(0.111) 
EE-lotteries * Optimism    0.155 *** 
(0.055) 
Constant 0.835 *** 
(0.134) 
1.179 *** 
(0.147) 
0.603 *** 
(0.162) 
0.602 *** 
(0.161) 
Observations 1139 1139 1139 1139 
Notes. This table displays the results of four OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the size of the 
endowment effect in each game: the WTA-WTP.  In column 1 optimism is the independent variable, in column 2 
gender and an interaction effect gender*optimism is added, and in columns 3 and 4 the average individual 
endowment effect in lotteries and interaction effect with optimism are added. Optimism is the subjective 
expected value (based upon the decision and the subjective beliefs of the participant) of a WTA-game minus the 
subjective expected value of the corresponding WTP-game. EE-lotteries is the average size of the endowment 
effect in the fixed lotteries, per individual. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Standard errors are 
clustered on individuals. 
*** (**) denotes significance at the 0.01 (0.05) level. 
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 4. Conclusion 
The presence of the endowment effect has been studied in relation to individual decision 
making in hundreds of experiments since the eighties (starting with Thaler 1980). In this 
paper we report an experimental study about the endowment effect in a strategic context: 
participants have either the right to play a game and are asked for their WTA, or they do not 
have the right to play and are asked for their WTP. In line with Isoni et al (2011) we use the 
Becker-deGroot-Marschak procedure and a within-subject design. We also elicit the beliefs 
about the play of others, and the participant’s action in case he keeps or buys the right to 
play. In the second part of the experiment the endowment effect is measured with lotteries 
that are related to the games of the first part.  
To summarize our results: We find a strong endowment effect in most of the games we 
study (result 1). The second part of the experiment replicates the findings of Isoni et al. 
(2011): we find a strong endowment effect in lotteries (result 2). Interestingly, we find that 
the endowment effect is stronger in games than in lotteries (result 3). There also exists a 
significant correlation between the average individual endowment effect in games and 
lotteries (result 4). And finally, we observe that optimism can partly explain the endowment 
effect in games (result 5). 
Originally, the endowment effect was attributed only to loss aversion (Thaler 1980, 
Kahneman et al. 1991). Loss aversion is an essential part of Prospect Theory and the 
endowment effect can be considered as an illustration of loss aversion in a situation without 
risk (Kahneman et al. 1991). Other explanations are confusion and misunderstanding (see 
the experiments by Plott and Zeiler 2005, disputed by Bartling et al. 2015, and Fehr et al. 
2015); decision makers may use bargaining heuristics that are reasonable outside the 
laboratory (and according to Huck et al. 2005 may enhance evolutionary fitness) but are 
inappropriate in the experimental situation; and “bad deal” aversion. Decision makers may 
compare the price with some reference price, and selling for a lower (or buying for a higher) 
price than the reference price may be considered a bad deal. If decision makers use an 
unprecise (interval) valuation of the good (e.g., Butler and Loomes 2007, Isoni et al., 2016), 
and they want to prevent a “bad deal”, they will ask (bid) a price at the high (low) end of the 
interval. Bad deal aversion predicts a larger WTA-WTP gap when the uncertainty about the 
subjective value is larger. In games there is strategic uncertainty, which makes it harder to 
establish a subjective utility, compared with lotteries that have only explicit risk. So the 
finding of a larger average WTA-WTP gap in games is in line with the bad-deal aversion 
hypothesis. Our results are less in line with the loss aversion interpretation: if the WTA-WTP 
gap is interpreted as caused only by loss-aversion, the average loss-aversion parameter20 in 
20 If v is the value of the good, and λ the loss aversion parameter, WTA=λ v (because v is lost and the 
WTA prize is gained) and λ WTP=v (the amount WTP is lost and the good is gained), which can be 
rewritten as λ =WTA/v and λ =v/WTP, multiplying these two equations gives λ2=WTA/WTP and λ= 
(WTA/WTP)0.5 
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our study is in the range of 1.15-1.20, which is much lower than the approximately 2 often 
found in Prospect Theory studies.    
In this paper we also study another explanation for the endowment effect: optimism. An 
optimist will estimate the potential value of a good he owns higher than that of a good he 
does not own. Since beliefs are measured, we can measure the optimism of the decision 
maker, which we define as the difference of the subjective expected value of the game 
when the right to play is owned minus the subjective value when this right is not owned. We 
find a positive relation between optimism and the endowment effect. Although there are 
many studies on the effect of optimism (and overconfidence) on human decision-making 
(e.g. Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Malmendier and Tate 2008), never before (to our 
knowledge) has a link been made with the endowment effect.  However, optimism cannot 
be the main driver of the WTA-WTP gap, because we also find a significant effect in the 
cases where the beliefs in WTA and WTP cases are the same. Of course, human behavior is 
multi-determined and these explanations are not exclusive. Each explanation may play a 
smaller or larger role, depending on the circumstances and individual differences. 
Although many studies on the endowment effect already exist, we believe that there are 
promising directions for future research. First, the endowment effect can be studied in 
situations that are more social and less anonymous than the present study. If the 
endowment effect is (irrational) heuristic behavior, we would expect the effect to decrease, 
in line with studies that find smaller anomalies when decision makers have to justify their 
actions to others (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). However, if the effect were caused by real 
different subjective valuations, we would expect no decrease. Second, it would be 
interesting to relate the endowment effect with stable personality traits like overconfidence 
and other empirical measures of optimism.    
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Appendix 1A: Instructions 
Instructions 
The experiment consists of two parts. Part 2 will be explained after we have finished Part 1.  
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn 
a considerable amount of money. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and may depend on 
other participants’ decisions. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. At 
the beginning of this experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of 7 euros. 
Your decisions in the experiment are private to you. We ask that you do not communicate with other 
people during the experiment. Please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave 
and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of these rules. 
In this experiment you will be asked to buy or sell a certain item. We will first explain the buying task 
and we will then proceed to the selling task.  
Buying task 
The buying task works as follows. The experimenter will offer an item for sale. Your task is to make an 
offer for the item.  
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the maximum you would be willing to pay for the 
item and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this amount, and it 
will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the maximum you would be willing to 
pay and make that amount your offer.  
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to your offer 
and to the offers of all other persons in the room.  
If your offer is more than or the same as the fixed offer, then you buy the item. You had the high 
offer, so you are the buyer. But, here's the interesting part:  
You do not pay the amount you offered. Instead, you pay the fixed offer, an amount equal to or less 
than your offer.  
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 950, you have the high offer. You buy the 
item and pay only 950.  
If your offer is less than the fixed offer then you do not buy the item. Instead, you keep your 
money.  
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 1,020, you do not have the high offer. 
Therefore, you do not buy the item. You keep your money.  
As a buyer, you should offer exactly the maximum amount you would be willing to pay in exchange 
for the item being sold.  
Your best strategy is to determine your personal value for the item and record that value as your 
offer. There is not necessarily a "correct" value. Personal values can differ from individual to 
individual.  
The following example illustrates how you work out what's the maximum you are willing to pay.  
Imagine that I am a buyer and Item A is up for sale. How do I know what amount is the 
maximum I'd be willing to pay for Item A? Start with 1 cent. Would I be willing to pay 1 cent 
for the item? If so, then increase the amount to 2 cent. If I'm willing to pay 2 cent, then 
increase further. I keep increasing until I come to an amount that makes me indifferent 
between keeping the money and getting Item A.  
Example: would I pay €1 for A? Yes. Would I pay €2 for A? Yes. Would I pay €5 for A? Yes. 
Would I pay €6 for A? No, not €6. So I need to decrease. Would I pay €5.50? No, not that 
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much. How about €5.25? I don't care whether I end up with €5.25 or the item. Then that is 
the maximum I'd be willing to pay for Item A.  
The key to determining the maximum you'd be willing to pay is remembering that you will not pay the 
amount you bid. Instead, if you pay anything, you will pay the fixed offer.  
Why is my best strategy to bid the maximum I'd be willing to pay? Let's go back to the example:  
Say that I decide that the maximum I'd be willing to pay for Item A is €5.25.  
What happens if I bid less than €5.25? Say I bid €5.  
If the fixed offer is, say, €5.10, then I don't get the item. Had I bid €5.25, I would have 
received the item and had to pay only €5.10 for an item that I think is worth €5.25. I lose out.  
What happens if I bid higher than €5.25? Say I bid €5.50.  
If the fixed offer is €5.45, then I have to pay €5.45 for an item that I really think is worth only 
€5.25. I lose out.  
Selling task 
The selling task works as follows. The experimenter wishes to buy an item that you own. Your task is 
to make an offer for the item.  
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the minimum you would be willing to accept and 
offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this amount, and it will not be 
to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the minimum you would be willing to accept and 
make that amount your offer.  
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to your offer 
and to the offers of all other persons in the room.  
If your offer is less than or the same as the fixed offer, then you sell the item. You had the low offer, 
so you are the seller. But, here's the interesting part. You do not receive your offer. Instead, you 
receive the fixed offer, a price equal to or higher than your offer.  
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 1,020, you have the low offer. You sell the 
item and you receive the fixed offer of 1,020.  
If your offer is more than the fixed offer then you do not sell your item. You keep the item. 
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 950, you do not have the low offer. 
Therefore, you do not sell the item.  
As a seller, you should offer the minimum amount you would be willing to accept in exchange for 
the item you own.  
Just as you saw in the case of the buying task, your best strategy is to determine your personal value 
for the item and record that value as your offer. There is not necessarily a "correct" value. Personal 
values can differ from individual to individual.  
The following example illustrates how you work out what's the minimum you are willing to accept.  
Imagine that I am a seller and I own Item B. How do I know what amount is the minimum I'd 
be willing to accept to give up Item B? Start with €100. Would I be willing to give up item B in 
exchange for €100? If so, then decrease the amount to €95. If I'm willing to accept €95 to 
give up Item B, then decrease further. I keep decreasing until I come to an amount that 
makes me indifferent between keeping Item B and getting the money.  
Example. Would I accept €10 to give up Item B? Yes. Would I accept €8 for B? Yes. Would I 
accept €7 for B? Yes. Would I accept €6 for B? No, not €6. So I need to increase. Would I 
accept €6.50? I don't care whether I end up with €6.50 or Item B. Then that is the minimum 
I'd be willing to accept for Item B. I'll record that number on my computer.  
The key to determining the minimum you'd be willing to accept is remembering that you will not 
receive the amount you ask for. Instead, if you receive anything, you will always get the fixed offer.  
Why is my best strategy to bid the minimum I'd be willing to accept? Let's go back to the example:  
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Say I decide that the minimum I'd be willing to accept for Item B is €6.50.  
What happens if I ask for less than €6.50? Say I ask for only €6.  
If the fixed offer is, say, €6.25, then I have to sell my item. I lose out because I have to give up 
Item B which I think is worth €6.50, but I only get €6.25 in exchange.  
What happens if I ask for more than €6.50? Say I ask for €7.  
If the fixed offer is €6.75, then I do not sell. But, had I bid €6.50, I would have sold the item 
and received €6.75 for an item that I think is worth only €6.50. I lose out.  
 
Offers in the buying or selling task 
Offers in the buying and selling task are previously generated and are between 0.00 and 8.00 euro (all 
numbers are equally likely). In order to assure you that the fixed offers are completely unrelated to 
your offers or your personal value of the item, they were randomly generated before the start of the 
experiment. The offers are printed, put in a closed envelope and attached to the whiteboard. If you 
like, you can after the experiment check that the envelope contains indeed the offers used to 
determine you earnings. In the envelope, there are also the randomly determined periods that will be 
paid.  
 
The item you buy or sell is the right to play a game 
We didn't tell you yet what the item is that you will buy or sell. In the first part of the experiment this 
item will be the right to play a game.  
At the beginning of a period you will see a two person game, similar to the one displayed below. In 
some periods you will have the right to play this game and we will ask you the minimum amount you 
are willing to accept to sell this right to the experimenter. In other periods you will not have the right 
to play this game and we will ask you the maximum amount you are willing to pay to purchase this 
right.  
 
 
This is only an illustration of the kind of game you will find in the experiment; we will not use a game 
with these exact numbers in the experiment itself.  
The first column in the table displays your options (A and B) and the first row of the table displays the 
options of the other player (also A and B). The other cells in the table display the payoff for each of 
the players for that combination of choices. Your payoffs (first number in each cell) are printed in red 
and the payoffs of the other player (second number in each cell) in blue. For example, if you choose A 
and the other player chooses B, you will earn 1 euro and the other player will earn 0 euros, and if 
both players choose A, each player will earn 4 euros. Note that the numbers indicated in each cell will 
always correspond to Euro amounts. 
What action do you choose? 
In each game we will ask you what action (A or B) you choose, if you would have the right to play this 
game. If, at the end of the experiment, that period is (randomly) chosen to paid, we will open an 
envelope to find the fixed offer and first determine whether you have the right to play the game. If 
you have this right (either because you had the right to start with and didn't sell it, or because you 
purchased that right), you payoff will be determined by the action you have chosen and the action of 
another player in this room you will be coupled with.  
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What action do you expect others to choose? 
In addition we are interested in your expectations about the behaviour of other players in this game. 
In each period we ask you how many out of 10 randomly drawn participants in this room will have 
chosen A and B. You will fill in these expectations in the cells below the table of the game.  
You can earn money by predicting well. At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose one 
period and compare your expectation with the actual choices of 10 other participants. Your earnings 
are the number of correct predictions you made, times 50 cents. For example, if you reported that 7 
participants would choose A and 3 participants would choose B and we find that in fact 4 participants 
have chosen A and 6 participants have chosen B, you correctly guessed 4 A-choices and 3 B-choices 
and you will earn 7*50 cents is 3.50 euros.  
Of course, the sum of your predictions for A and B choices have to add up to 10.  
Procedure per period 
In each period you have to  
1. Choose an action A or B; 
2. Predict how many of 10 others in this room will choose A and B; 
3. formulate an offer for which you are  
o willing to sell the right to play this game (in periods you have this right) 
o willing to pay for the right to play this game (in periods you don't have this right)  
Part 1 earnings 
You will be informed about your earnings from Part 1 after the last period of the second part of the 
experiment. For Part 1, you will be paid the results of:  
1. one period of the first part in which you did have the right to play 
2. The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see 
previous page). Now there are two possible cases:  
o Your asking price was lower than the fixed offer, you have sold your right and your 
earnings are equal to the fixed offer. 
o Your asking price was higher than the fixed offer, so you have kept your right to 
play. The computer will couple you with another participant who also has the right 
to play and your earnings are determined by your choice and the choice of the 
participant you are coupled with according to the payoff table of the game. 
3. one period of the first part in which you did not have the right to play 
4. The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see 
previous page). Now there are two possible cases:  
o Your offer was lower than the fixed offer. This means you will not play the game. 
o Your offer was higher than the fixed offer. This means that you have bought the 
right to play, and you pay the amount of the fixed offer. The computer will couple 
you with another participant who also has the right to play and your earnings are 
determined by your choice and the choice of the participant you are coupled with 
according to the payoff table of the game. 
5. We will for one randomly chosen period determine your prediction earnings. The computer 
will randomly choose 10 participants (other than you) and compare your predictions with 
their choices according to the rule explained in the previous screen. 
Note that depending on your decisions, you may incur losses. In this case, your show-up fee of 7 
euros will be used to cover them. However, you will never end up owing us money. 
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Complications: odd number of players 
You may wonder what happens when we have an odd number of participants with a right to play the 
game. We solve this problem in the following way. Before the experiment started, we have for each 
period separately randomly assigned one participant as the "odd player". Nobody will know who this 
is. If the offers of the participants combined with the offer in the envelop is such that we would have 
an odd number of players, the outcome for this "odd player" will not be according to his or her 
preferences. For example, we play out a period in which 11 participants have bought the right to play. 
If the "odd player" is one of these 11 players he will not buy the right to play the game and thus not 
play the game. If the "odd player" did not buy the right to play, he has to buy it anyhow for the fixed 
offer and play the game.  
Note that there is a 50% probability that this will happen, and the probability that you will be the 
"odd player" is only 1 divided by the number of participants in this session. So if we have 20 
participants there is a probability of 1/20 * 1/2= 2.5% that your earnings are not determined by your 
choices, and thus with 97.5% probability your choices will determine you earnings. So it is still very 
important that you make the choices you consider to be best!  
Practice Questions 
We will now ask you some questions to check your understanding. You can always browse back to 
previous screens. When you have a question for the experimenter please raise your hand.  
Please note that the situations described below are hypothetical. In the experiment, decisions and 
earnings will depend on the actual choices of the participants.  
 
A. 
Consider the game displayed above. What will be your earnings 
when you have chosen B and the other player has chosen A when 
the game is played?  
 
  
B. 
What will be the earnings of the other player when you have 
chosen A and the other player has chosen B when the game is 
played? 
 
  
C. 
You predicted than 3 players will have chosen A and 7 will have 
chosen B. We find that in fact that 6 players have played A and 4 
players B. What are your earnings in euros if this period 
predictions will be paid? 
 
  
D. 
This period you have the right to play the game. The minimum 
amount that you are willing to accept in exchange for your right 
to play was 5.25. The fixed offer in the envelope is 6. 
 
 I sell my right for 5.25 
 I sell my right for 6 
 I don't sell my right and play the 
game 
E. 
This period you do not have the right to play the game. The 
maximum amount you are willing to pay to buy the right to play 
this game was 7 and the fixed offer in the envelope is 6. 
 
  I buy the right to play for 6 
  I buy the right to play for 7 
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  I don't buy the right to play and 
I will not play the game 
 
Instructions Part 2 
This part of the experiment will consist of 54 periods.  
In each period you will be presented with a lottery. Below you see an example of such lottery.  
 
This lottery offers a 60% chance of winning 5 euros, and a 40% chance of winning 0 euros.  
In some periods you own the right to play this lottery and we will ask you for the minimum amount 
you are willing to accept in exchange for your right to play this lottery.  
In other periods you don't own the right to play this lottery, and we will ask you for the maximum 
amount you are willing to pay to buy the right to play this lottery.  
Like in the first part of the experiment, your offer will be compared with a fixed offer that is randomly 
drawn before the start of the experiment (and is in the envelope on the whiteboard).  
At the end of the experiment two periods of part 2 will be played for money: one where you did own 
the right to play the lottery and one where you didn't have that right.  
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Appendix 1B: Screenshots 
 
 
 
 
Appendix page 7 
  
 
 
 
 
Appendix page 8 
Appendix 1C: Instructions on handout 
Summary of the Instructions 
The experiment consists of two parts. Part 2 will be explained after we have finished Part 1.  
In this experiment you will be asked to buy or sell a certain item. We will first explain the buying task and we 
will then proceed to the selling task.  
 
Buying task 
The buying task works as follows. The experimenter will offer an item for sale. Your task is to make an offer for 
the item. As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the maximum you would be willing to pay for the 
item and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this amount, and it will not be 
to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the maximum you would be willing to pay and make that 
amount your offer.  
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to your offer and to 
the offers of all other persons in the room. If your offer is more than or the same as the fixed offer, then you 
buy the item. You had the high offer, so you are the buyer. But, here's the interesting part:  
You do not pay the amount you offered. Instead, you pay the fixed offer, an amount equal to or less than your 
offer.  
As a buyer, you should offer exactly the maximum amount you would be willing to pay in exchange for the 
item being sold. Your best strategy is to determine your personal value for the item and record that value as 
your offer. There is not necessarily a "correct" value. Personal values can differ from individual to individual.  
The key to determining the maximum you'd be willing to pay is remembering that you will not pay the amount 
you bid. Instead, if you pay anything, you will pay the fixed offer.  
 
Selling task 
The selling task works as follows. The experimenter wishes to buy an item that you own. Your task is to make 
an offer for the item. As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the minimum you would be willing to 
accept and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this amount, and it will not 
be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the minimum you would be willing to accept and make 
that amount your offer.  
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to your offer and to 
the offers of all other persons in the room. If your offer is less than or the same as the fixed offer, then you sell 
the item. You had the low offer, so you are the seller. But, here's the interesting part. You do not receive your 
offer. Instead, you receive the fixed offer, a price equal to or higher than your offer.  
As a seller, you should offer the minimum amount you would be willing to accept in exchange for the item 
you own.  
Just as you saw in the case of the buying task, your best strategy is to determine your personal value for the 
item and record that value as your offer. There is not necessarily a "correct" value. Personal values can differ 
from individual to individual.  
The key to determining the minimum you'd be willing to accept is remembering that you will not receive the 
amount you ask for. Instead, if you receive anything, you will always get the fixed offer.  
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Offers in the buying or selling task 
Offers in the buying and selling task are previously generated and are between 0.00 and 8.00 euro (all 
numbers are equally likely). In order to assure you that the fixed offers are completely unrelated to your offers 
or your personal value of the item, they were randomly generated before the start of the experiment. The 
offers are printed, put in a closed envelope and attached to the whiteboard. If you like, you can after the 
experiment check that the envelope contains indeed the offers used to determine you earnings. In the 
envelope, there are also the randomly determined periods that will be paid.  
 
The item you buy or sell is the right to play a game 
We didn't tell you yet what the item is that you will buy or sell. In the first part of the experiment this item will 
be the right to play a game.  
At the beginning of a period you will see a two person game, similar to the one displayed below. In some 
periods you will have the right to play this game and we will ask you the minimum amount you are willing to 
accept to sell this right to the experimenter. In other periods you will not have the right to play this game and 
we will ask you the maximum amount you are willing to pay to purchase this right.  
 
 
This is only an illustration of the kind of game you will find in the experiment; we will not use a game with 
these exact numbers in the experiment itself.  
The first column in the table displays your options (A and B) and the first row of the table displays the options 
of the other player (also A and B). The other cells in the table display the payoff for each of the players for that 
combination of choices. Your payoffs (first number in each cell) are printed in red and the payoffs of the other 
player (second number in each cell) in blue. For example, if you choose A and the other player chooses B, you 
will earn 1 euro and the other player will earn 0 euros, and if both players choose A, each player will earn 4 
euros. Note that the numbers indicated in each cell will always correspond to Euro amounts. 
 
What action do you choose? 
In each game we will ask you what action (A or B) you choose, if you would have the right to play this game. If, 
at the end of the experiment, that period is (randomly) chosen to paid, we will open an envelop to find the 
fixed offer and first determine whether you have the right to play the game. If you have this right (either 
because you had the right to start with and didn't sell it, or because you purchased that right), you payoff will 
be determined by the action you have chosen and the action of another player in this room you will be 
coupled with.  
 
What action do you expect others to choose? 
In addition we are interested in your expectations about the behaviour of other players in this game. In each 
period we ask you how many out of 10 randomly drawn participants in this room will have chosen A and B. 
You will fill in these expectations in the cells below the table of the game.  
You can earn money by predicting well. At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose one period and 
compare your expectation with the actual choices of 10 other participants. Your earnings are the number of 
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correct predictions you made, times 50 cents. For example, if you reported that 7 participants would choose A 
and 3 participants would choose B and we find that in fact 4 participants have chosen A and 6 participants 
have chosen B, you correctly guessed 4 A-choices and 3 B-choices and you will earn 7*50 cents is 3.50 euros.  
Of course, the sum of your predictions for A and B choices have to add up to 10.  
 
Procedure per period 
In each period you have to  
4. Choose an action A or B; 
5. Predict how many of 10 others in this room will choose A and B; 
6. formulate an offer for which you are  
o willing to sell the right to play this game (in periods you have this right) 
o willing to pay for the right to play this game (in periods you don't have this right)  
 
Part 1 earnings 
You will be informed about your earnings from Part 1 after the last period of the second part of the 
experiment. For Part 1, you will be paid the results of:  
6. one period of the first part in which you did have the right to play 
The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see previous 
page). Now there are two possible cases:  
o Your asking price was lower than the fixed offer, you have sold your right and your earnings 
are equal to the fixed offer. 
o Your asking price was higher than the fixed offer, so you have kept your right to play. The 
computer will couple you with another participant who also has the right to play and your 
earnings are determined by your choice and the choice of the participant you are coupled 
with according to the payoff table of the game. 
7. one period of the first part in which you did not have the right to play 
The fixed offer for this period is determined randomly before the experiment started (see previous 
page). Now there are two possible cases:  
o Your offer was lower than the fixed offer. This means you will not play the game. 
o Your offer was higher than the fixed offer. This means that you have bought the right to play, 
and you pay the amount of the fixed offer. The computer will couple you with another 
participant who also has the right to play and your earnings are determined by your choice 
and the choice of the participant you are coupled with according to the payoff table of the 
game. 
8. We will for one randomly chosen period determine your prediction earnings. The computer will 
randomly choose 10 participants (other than you) and compare your predictions with their choices 
according to the rule explained in the previous screen. 
Note that depending on your decisions, you may incur losses. In this case, your show-up fee of 7 euros will be 
used to cover them. However, you will never end up owing us money. 
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Appendix B: Additional tables 
Table B-1: List of lotteries used in part 2. In periods where no probabilities for A and B are listed, the 
probabilities depend on the beliefs of the participant in the related game (subjective lotteries). 
Period WTA or 
WTP 
version 
Related 
Game 
Option A Option B Prob. A Prob. B 
1 WTA 3 5 1 60 40 
2 WTP 7 5 2 30 70 
3 WTA 8 4 -4 60 40 
4 WTP 9 1 4 30 70 
5 WTA 1 2 4 50 50 
6 WTP 3 4 0   
7 WTA 7 13 0   
8 WTP 8 1 3   
9 WTA 9 7 0   
10 WTP 2 3 1 50 50 
11 WTA 3 3 4 60 40 
12 WTP 7 12 -1   
13 WTA 8 0 2   
14 WTP 9 8 1 30 70 
15 WTA 4 7 0 50 50 
16 WTP 3 4 0 60 40 
17 WTA 7 6 3 30 70 
18 WTP 8 5 -3 60 40 
19 WTA 9 0 3 30 70 
20 WTP 10 6 -4   
21 WTA 5 6 0   
22 WTP 3 2 3   
23 WTA 6 2 6 50 50 
24 WTP 7 12 -1 30 70 
25 WTA 8 0 2 60 40 
26 WTP 9 1 4   
27 WTA 10 7 -3   
28 WTP 1 3 5 50 50 
29 WTA 2 4 2 50 50 
30 WTP 4 8 1 50 50 
31 WTA 5 7 3   
32 WTP 7 5 2   
33 WTA 6 10 -2 50 50 
34 WTP 8 1 3 60 40 
35 WTA 9 7 0 30 70 
36 WTP 10 8 2   
37 WTA 1 6 0 50 50 
38 WTP 2 4 0 50 50 
39 WTA 3 5 1   
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40 WTP 5 7 1   
41 WTA 7 13 0 30 70 
42 WTP 8 5 -3   
43 WTA 9 0 3   
44 WTP 3 2 3 60 40 
45 WTA 2 5 1 50 50 
46 WTP 6 9 -3 50 50 
47 WTA 7 6 3   
48 WTP 9 8 1   
49 WTA 10 9 3   
50 WTP 1 7 1 50 50 
51 WTA 3 3 4   
52 WTP 5 8 4   
53 WTA 8 4 -4   
54 WTP 6 1 5 50 50 
 
Table B2: Decisions in the games in the WTA and WTP periods. 
 WTP Choice 
 
 
 A B 
  
 A B 
W
TA
 C
ho
ic
e 
Game 1 
Coord. 
A 51 15 
 
Game 6 
Coord. 
A 52 17 
B 17 31 
 
B 18 27 
Game 2 
Chicken 
A 76 9 
 
Game 7 
Chicken 
A 40 17 
B 14 14 
 
B 19 38 
Game 3 
Stag Hunt 
A 81 14 
 
Game 8 
Stag Hunt 
A 76 2 
B 4 15 
 
B 12 24 
Game 4  
Coord. 
A 18 23 
 
Game 9  
Coord. 
A 12 26 
B 17 56 
 
B 9 67 
Game 5 
PDG 
A 52 16 
 
Game 10 
PDG 
A 39 11 
B 7 39 
 
B 8 56 
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Appendix C: Additional tables for participants who made few or no mistakes 
 
We have also analysed a subset of participants who make only few “mistakes”. A “mistake” 
is defined as a WTA (or a WTP) bid which is higher than the maximum payoff and lower than 
the minimum payoff in that game (for a given action) or lottery. However, note that some 
“mistakes” may not be mistakes at all. For example, someone with social preferences can 
have a value of the game that is lower than the minimum payoff, given his action, just 
because he doesn’t like to play this game21. On the other hand, some participants may have 
a preference of playing a game that goes above the possible earnings.  
The number of participants who make either 0, 1 or 2 dominated bids (out of 10) are 70 in 
the WTA games and 76 in the WTP games. Out of these, the number of participants who 
have 0, 1 or 2 dominated bids (out of 20 decisions) in the WTP and WTA games combined, 
is equal to 50. By just focusing on those 50 participants, we find that their WTA/WTP bids in 
each game are as follows: 
 
Table C1 (compare with table 2 in the paper) for selected participants, N=50. Descriptive 
statistics for WTA-WTP valuations for each game 
 WTA valuation WTP valuation  Frequencies 
 Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
dev. 
p-value 
 
EE Anti 
EE 
No 
EE 
Game 1 3.65 3.95 1.30 2.21 2 0.92 0.000 38 3 9 
Game 2 3.30 3.25 0.93 3.30 3.13 0.91 0.942 20 19 11 
Game 3 4.46 5 0.77 3.99 4 0.94 0.002 30 11 9 
Game 4 3.54 3.5 1.34 2.5 2.88 1.48 0.000 37 10 3 
Game 5 4.78 5 1.09 3.54 3 1.22 0.000 38 5 7 
Game 6 3.81 3.88 1.64 3.54 3 1.50 0.131 26 16 8 
Game 7 4.95 5 1.39 4.46 4.5 1.54 0.068 30 15 5 
Game 8 2.87 3.38 1.37 2.24 2.5 1.47 0.000 29 7 14 
Game 9 2.90 3 1.21 1.47 1.05 1.15 0.000 37 7 6 
Game 10 4.45 4.63 1.62 4.28 4 1.34 0.587 20 20 10 
Note: p-values are based upon a Wilcoxon signed rank test (2-sided) 
 
These results are very much like the original table 2 in the paper, the only difference that the 
effect in game 7 is now only marginally significant (partly caused by the smaller N). 
 
21 For example, consider the prisoners’ dilemma WTP game 5 and consider a Fehr-Schmidt social 
utility function with beta=0.6 (he dislikes the outcome where the other person cooperates and he 
defects) and alpha=0.8 (he dislikes the other situation where he cooperates and the other player 
defects even more) and the decision maker expects that 50% of the players will cooperate (choice A). 
This decision maker will defect (B) because EU(A)=1.2<EU(B)=3.9, but have a valuation (3.9) lower 
than 4.  
Appendix page 14 
                                                          
We also reanalyzed the fixed lotteries with the 83 participants with 0,1 or 2 mistakes (out of 
30 decisions, so in fact this criterion is stricter). We find essentially the same results as in 
table 3 of the original paper. 
 
Table C2 (compare with table 3 in the paper) for selected participants N=83 (82 for 2A 
and 6A). Descriptive statistics for WTA-WTP valuations for each fixed lottery 
R
el
at
ed
 G
am
e 
Pe
rio
ds
 W
TA
-W
TP
 
O
pt
io
n 
A
 
O
pt
io
n 
B
 
Pr
ob
. A
 
Pr
ob
. B
 
Ex
p.
 v
al
ue
 WTA offer WTP offer 
 Frequencies 
Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
dev. p-value 
EE Anti 
EE 
No 
EE 
1A 5-28 2 4 50 50 3 2.97 3 0.46 2.57 2.65 0.51 0.000 46 10 27 
1B 37-50 6 0 50 50 3 3.15 3 0.93 1.93 2 1.20 0.000 60 8 15 
2A 29-10 4 2 50 50 3 3.05 3 0.51 2.65 2.63 0.43 0.000 49 10 24 
2B 45-38 5 1 50 50 3 3.04 3 0.74 2.67 2.85 0.71 0.002 43 21 19 
3A 1-16 5 1 60 40 3.4 3.34 3.4 0.97 2.86 3 0.76 0.000 51 15 17 
3B 11-44 3 4 60 40 3.4 3.41 3.4 0.37 3.18 3.2 0.33 0.000 45 15 23 
4AB 15-30 7 0 50 50 3.5 3.36 3.5 0.87 2.31 2.5 1.18 0.000 56 12 15 
6A 23-54 2 6 50 50 4 3.94 4 0.76 3.27 3.33 0.79 0.000 48 14 21 
6B 33-46 10 -2 50 50 4 3.73 4 1.68 3.17 3 1.39 0.002 44 21 18 
7A 17-2 6 3 30 70 3.9 3.96 4 0.57 3.42 3.5 0.57 0.000 51 10 22 
7B 41-24 13 0 30 70 3.9 4.46 4 1.51 3.37 3 1.66 0.000 54 16 13 
8A 3-18 4 -4 60 40 0.8 1.50 1.5 1.01 0.17 0 0.87 0.000 68 5 10 
8B 25-34 0 2 60 40 0.8 1.19 1 0.64 0.52 0.5 0.41 0.000 58 6 19 
9A 19-4 0 3 30 70 2.1 2.12 2 0.50 1.63 1.75 0.66 0.000 45 13 25 
9B 35-14 7 0 30 70 2.1 2.70 2.5 1.33 1.29 1 0.94 0.000 61 8 14 
Note: p-values are based upon a Wilcoxon signed rank test (2-sided). 
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Table C3 (compare with table 4 in the paper) for selected participants N=66. Descriptive 
statistics for WTA-WTP valuations for each subjective lottery 
R
el
at
ed
 G
am
e 
Pe
rio
ds
 W
TA
-
W
TP
 
O
pt
io
n 
A
 
O
pt
io
n 
B
 WTA-WTP gap  Frequencies 
Mean Median Std. dev. 
p-
value EE 
No 
EE 
Anti 
EE 
3A 39-6 5 1 0.21 0 0.81 0.022 32 18 16 
3B 51-22 3 4 0.27 0.05 0.45 0.000 35 26 5 
5A 21-40 6 0 1.12 0.65 1.48 0.000 42 19 5 
5B 31-52 7 3 0.72 0.5 1.19 0.000 40 19 7 
7A 47-32 6 3 0.41 0.5 0.87 0.000 38 19 9 
7B 7-12 13 0 0.62 0 1.90 0.028 31 13 22 
8A 53-42 4 -4 0.87 0.81 1.02 0.000 42 24 0 
8B 13-8 0 2 0.50 0.20 0.85 0.000 41 24 1 
9A 43-26 0 3 0.70 0.50 0.94 0.000 44 15 7 
9B 9-48 7 0 1.33 1 1.77 0.000 48 13 5 
10A 27-20 7 -3 0.19 0 1.64 0.893 25 12 29 
10B 49-36 9 3 0.86 0.60 1.26 0.000 40 13 13 
Note: p-values are based upon a Wilcoxon signed rank test (2-sided). 
 
In the subjective lotteries 66 participants made 0,1 or 2 mistakes (out of 24 decisions). 
Again, the results are about the same as in the original table 4, and even somewhat 
stronger: the endowment effect is statistically significant in 11 of the 12 comparisons 
(compared with 10 out of 12 in the original table 4). 
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